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In his most recent work on John Dewey, John Shook explores Dewey’s political 
thought in order to illuminate Dewey’s conception of democracy and demonstrate 
the interlocking quality of his democratic and educational theories. As the book’s 
subtitle indicates, Shook sees democracy and education as inseparable enterprises 
for Dewey, with democracy being fundamentally defined by the continuous educa-
tion of individuals, and with specifically educational spaces (e.g., schools) serving to 
directly promote this definitive purpose of democracy. The particular educational 
goal that Shook identifies in Dewey’s thought is the cultivation of “social intelli-
gence,” a quality that allows individuals to effectively engage opposing viewpoints 
and peacefully resolve conflicts over policies for addressing our pressing social 
problems—a quality that Shook rightly associates with deliberative democracy 
(the most prominent model in contemporary democratic thought). There is much 
to recommend in Shook’s analysis, for he does identify some crucial elements in 
Dewey’s often-perplexing account of democracy. However, the analysis does not 
adequately account for the more radical—and in particular, anticapitalist—quali-
ties of Dewey’s democratic and educational theories, and concurrently does not 
account for how Dewey’s thought goes beyond the tenets of deliberative democracy.
The first chapter of Shook’s book establishes that, for Dewey, democracy and 
education are not distinct undertakings. Shook points out that attempts to first con-
ceive a democratic theory or an educational theory, and then to construct the other 
in relation to the first, are fundamentally un-Deweyan: “Democracy itself must be 
fully understood in the course of asking how education can help develop demo-
cratic citizens. If unrelated definitions of democracy and education are brought 
together for comparison, there could be little surprise at their failure to automati-
cally cohere” (5). Shook identifies democracy with the practice of citizens coming 
together to intelligently resolve their common problems, and education with the 
cultivation of individuals’ capacity to engage in this continuous problem-solving. 
Chapter 2 explains that, because the need for intelligent problem-solving never ends, 
a democracy must ensure that adult life is as educative as possible and that adult 
individuals can continue to develop their social intelligence: “Because democracy is 
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a form of life that provides extensive opportunities for intelligent problem-solving, 
democracy is an education for adults as well as for children” (32). Individuals get 
further education in the process of exactly the type of problem-solving with oth-
ers that they are to be educated for, which makes it essential—for both democratic 
and educational purposes—that adults have the opportunity to deliberate together 
about how to solve pressing social problems. Chapter 3 directly classifies Dewey 
as a deliberative democrat, and more specifically as an advocate of what Shook 
calls “public deliberation polyarchy,” which is defined by different activist groups 
“[competing] for the general public’s sympathy and the government’s attention” 
(57). To the extent that such groups put their own views up for challenge by others, 
and also give reasonable consideration to the views of competing groups, we would 
have the type of deliberative democracy that Dewey seeks.
The last three chapters of the book move from the more abstract discussion 
of Dewey’s democratic principles to more concrete social issues. Chapter 4 explores 
how Dewey seeks to promote equal opportunity with his educational methods, and 
the way Dewey’s approach to schooling can help illuminate several present-day 
social issues. The discussion of equal opportunity in this chapter is focused on the 
equal opportunity to participate in public deliberation to resolve public conflicts. 
The pressing social issues discussed involve the attempts of racial, ethnic, and cul-
tural minorities to integrate with the broader society while also preserving their 
distinct identities, as well as the efforts to protect public education from privatiza-
tion (103–12). In chapter 5, Shook constructs a Deweyan account of punishment—
an account that is opposed to mere retribution and focuses on the moral education, 
and enhancement of the social responsibility, of offenders. This type of punishment, 
for Shook, coheres with Dewey’s overall message that democracy must be defined 
by the continuous education of individuals (132). Chapter 6 discusses the place 
religious groups have within Dewey’s public deliberation polyarchy. These groups 
would certainly not be excluded from debate, though they must understand that 
they are not simply to preach their values, but to put them up for challenge by oth-
ers. Shook identifies liberal Christianity as having particular value for Deweyan 
democracy, and, drawing on Dewey’s own unique usage of the term “religious,” 
interprets the type of social unity promoted by deliberative democracy as being an 
essentially “religious” unity for Dewey (150–53).
There is little that I find to be inaccurate in Shook’s analysis, but I also think 
his account of Dewey’s democratic thinking does not quite convey the more fun-
damental obstacles Dewey sees in the way of democracy’s achievement. I specifi-
cally see the book as giving inadequate attention to Dewey’s view that democracy 
is directly hindered by large capital and economic inequality. One way that this 
manifests itself is in Shook’s depiction of what a “problem” is for Dewey; Shook 
characterizes it mainly as a pressing policy issue on which different sides hold con-
flicting views. This is not necessarily incorrect, but it misses the primary meaning 
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of a problem identified by Dewey in The Public and Its Problems (1927/1954), which 
is the problem of state power continuing to be used (despite apparently meaningful 
democratic reforms) primarily to serve exclusive private interests rather than the 
interests of the broader public (77, 107–08). For Dewey, then, the important point 
is not just that those involved in debate over public issues tend not to deliberate 
very well together, but that honest consideration of different options for resolving 
policy conflicts is effectively prevented by the social and political power of wealth. 
Powerful economic interests are able to exercise disproportionate influence over 
election and policy outcomes, and Dewey sees this as the pressing problem we 
must resolve, rather than simply encouraging those who debate policy issues to 
deliberate more properly. Relatedly, I also find the book to not quite capture how, 
in Dewey’s view, political democracy is not a concept that can be achieved or even 
analyzed on its own. Achieving this kind of democracy requires the concurrent 
achievement of social democracy, because structural inequalities in the broader so-
ciety inevitably exercise a corrupting effect on political debate, and because such 
inequalities are simply undemocratic in themselves by denying individuals the op-
portunity to exercise control over their lives. At one point, Shook, while discussing 
what he sees as Dewey’s focus on “broad political equality” defined by “political 
empowerment and participation,” only parenthetically notes that he is not “deny-
ing that there are other needed forms of equal opportunity in the economic or so-
cial spheres” (74). There are also brief mentions in the book of Dewey’s advocacy 
of workplace democracy and his desire for a certain type of socialism, but these 
topics do not receive the attention that I would argue they deserve within a dis-
cussion of Dewey’s democratic theory. These issues of social democratization are, 
in fact, essential to Dewey’s theory, and the political aspect of democracy (which 
is Shook’s focus) cannot be attended to in Dewey’s view without also attending to 
these broader social matters.
Similarly, I do not think Shook quite captures the anticapitalist quality of 
Dewey’s educational thought. The book associates Dewey’s ideas with the contem-
porary educational work of Amy Gutmann (a prominent deliberative democrat), 
and portrays him as primarily seeking to allow students to engage in group delib-
eration for solving problems in the classroom. This is indeed an element of Dewey’s 
educational thinking, but at least as important, in my view, is Dewey’s conception 
of how typical schooling practices tend to cultivate capitalistic (and for Dewey, 
undemocratic) norms and behaviors, and how schools could work against such 
inculcation. In Individualism Old and New (1930/1962), Dewey claims “that which 
prevents the schools from doing their educational work freely is precisely the pres-
sure—for the most part indirect, to be sure—of domination by the money-motif of 
our economic regime” (127). He sees schools as not simply failing to develop the 
capacity to deliberate with others to solve problems, but as leading youth to see 
themselves and others through a capitalistic lens, and to accept the legitimacy of 
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the work experience that characterizes capitalist society. This is a prominent theme 
in Democracy and Education (1916/1966), where he points to “external aims” (e.g., 
grades) as leading students to see schoolwork as insignificant activity serving only 
the purpose of compensation at the activity’s finish, and to judge their own value 
and that of others by how one stands individualistically in the gradebook (105–10). 
Dewey sees this as reproducing dominant industrial conditions by making un-
democratic work experiences (in which activity is intrinsically insignificant and 
attains value only through compensation at the end) seem natural to individuals 
at a young age. He further sees this as reflecting the “domination by the money-
motif of our economic regime” by leading students to evaluate work according to 
an essentially monetary end (the grade), and to evaluate themselves and others by 
the attainment of this end. The type of deliberation, group problem-solving, and 
cultivation of “social intelligence” that Shook describes is surely part of Dewey’s 
educational thought. But this does not fully capture how Dewey believes schools 
can promote the (democratic) continuous education of individuals. We must also 
account for the importance he places on educating students in noncapitalistic fash-
ion—that is, educating them without relying on grades to motivate activity—so 
that activity “can be carried on for its own sake” (204) and not simply to attain a 
static, external reward.
When we recognize these qualities in Dewey’s democratic and educational 
theories, it should lead us to question the categorization (made by Shook and 
many other Dewey scholars and democratic theorists) of Dewey as a deliberative 
democrat. In Liberalism and Social Action (1935), Dewey declares that under un-
equal social conditions, improved standards for policy discussion are “weak reeds 
to depend upon for systematic origination of comprehensive plans,” and that the 
“invention and projection of far-reaching social plans” is necessary for addressing 
social inequality (70, 73). It is also well-known that Dewey supported the Pullman 
workers’ strike in Chicago in 1894, marched in the streets for women’s suffrage in 
the early twentieth century, and attempted to create a radical political party in the 
United States during the 1930s to directly combat the social and political power 
of wealth. Such efforts are nondeliberative, for they can be coercive and are meant 
to compel concessions from advantaged social interests in order to achieve a far-
reaching social plan, rather than trying to convince the advantaged to change their 
views with reasons that they find acceptable (as deliberative democracy would have 
it). Deliberative democracy has been criticized for bracketing issues of social and 
economic inequality with its conception of deliberators exchanging reasons that 
all can accept in order to resolve policy debates. In my view, Dewey would likely 
make just such a critique if he confronted the arguments of deliberative demo-
crats. He clearly would like to see deliberation if our social conditions were more 
democratic, but under unequal conditions he would not equate deliberation with 
the achievement of democracy.
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Ultimately, Shook’s book accurately identifies and effectively illuminates the 
elements of Dewey’s democratic and educational theories that cohere with delib-
erative democracy. However, the book is largely inattentive to elements of Dewey’s 
thought that go beyond deliberative democracy. Dewey considers it democratically 
necessary to work against large capital and reduce economic inequality, and the 
idea of competing activist groups exchanging reasons does not capture Dewey’s 
position on how to achieve this change.
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